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11 Following in the footsteps of tobacco and alcohol? Stakeholder discourse in UK 
2 newspaper coverage of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy 
3
4 Abstract
5 Objective: In politically-contested health debates stakeholders on both sides present arguments and 
6 evidence in order to influence public opinion and the political agenda. The aim of this study was to 
7 examine whether stakeholders in the soft drinks industry levy (SDIL) debate sought to establish or 
8 undermine the acceptability of this policy through the news media and how this compared to similar 
9 policy debates in relation to tobacco and alcohol industries.
10 Design: Quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles discussing sugar-
11 sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation published in 11 UK newspapers between 1 April 2015 and 30 
12 November 2016, identified through the Nexis database. Direct stakeholder citations were entered 
13 into NVivo to allow inductive thematic analysis and comparison with an established typology of 
14 industry stakeholder arguments used by the alcohol and tobacco industries. 
15 Setting: UK newspapers.
16 Subjects: Proponents and opponents of SSB tax/SDIL cited in UK newspapers.
17 Results: 491 newspaper articles cited stakeholders’ (n=287) arguments in relation to SSB taxation 
18 (n=1,761: 65% supportive and 35% opposing). Stakeholders’ positions broadly reflected their vested 
19 interests. Inconsistencies arose from: changes in ideological position; insufficient clarity on the 
20 nature of the problem to be solved; policy priorities; consistency with academic rigour. Both 
21 opposing and supportive themes were comparable with the alcohol and tobacco industry typology.
22 Conclusions: Public health advocates were particularly prominent in the UK newspaper debate 
23 surrounding the SDIL. Advocates in future policy debates might benefit from seeking a similar level 
24 of prominence and avoiding inconsistencies by being clearer about the policy objective and 
25 mechanisms. 
26
27 Keywords: Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation; SSB tax; soft drinks industry levy; SDIL; public 
28 health policy; media content analysis; unhealthy commodity industries, UCIs.
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229 Introduction
30 Consumption of free sugars by UK adults accounts for 16-17% of their total energy intake(1), 
31 more than triple the 5% maximum recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO)(2). An 
32 econometric analysis of repeated cross-sectional data on diabetes and nutritional components of food 
33 from 175 countries found that sugar availability is a statistically significant determinant of diabetes 
34 prevalence rates worldwide(3). Briggs et al. estimated that a 20% tax on sugar-sweetened beverages 
35 (SSBs) might result in a 15% reduction in sugar consumption, potentially preventing approximately 
36 180,000 people in the UK from becoming obese each year(4). Evidence from countries such as 
37 Mexico(5; 6), Denmark(7) and parts of the USA(8) likewise suggest that SSB taxation might be an 
38 effective policy in tackling obesity, particularly as part of a multipronged approach(9; 10). 
39 In March 2016, the UK Government announced a Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL), which 
40 came into force in April 2018(11; 12). As anticipated, the SDIL led the soft drinks industry to 
41 reformulate their products to contain less sugar in order to reduce their liability to pay the levy(13; 
42 14). The SDIL represents an important part of the Government’s plan to reduce obesity(15) and dental 
43 decay in children(16; 17), and also prevent non-communicable diseases (NCDs) associated with excess 
44 sugar consumption(18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23). As such, the SDIL has been deemed particularly beneficial to 
45 young people and low income populations who suffer the highest burden of diseases associated with 
46 excess sugar consumption(16; 17). The SDIL might thus also reduce health inequalities(24; 25).
47 Regulatory attempts to reduce consumption of harmful commodities are often met with 
48 opposition from producers and marketers of those commodities, and those stakeholders have been 
49 shown to use common strategies in resisting the introduction of such upstream regulation. For 
50 example, Mialon et al’s recent systematic review of tactics used by the processed food industry in 
51 Australia identified similarities to anti-regulation strategies used by the tobacco and alcohol 
52 industries(26). Like other so-called unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs) they used front groups, 
53 lobbying and industry-funded research: to emphasise industry responsibility and the effectiveness 
54 of self-regulation; to question the effectiveness of statutory regulation; and frame excessive 
55 consumption as the responsibility of individuals, rather than the state(27; 28; 29; 30). More recently 
56 Petticrew et al suggested that the arguments and language used by the alcohol, food, soda and 
57 gambling industries may reflect the existence of a cross-industry ‘playbook’, whose use results in 
58 the undermining of effective public health policies(31). In contrast, there is less evidence of public 
59 health advocates using similar tactics to gain support for potentially effective regulation of harmful 
60 industry activities. Indeed, such advocates face considerable barriers to effectively influencing 
61 policy change, including limited resources, time and appropriate skills(32). In the case of minimum 
62 unit pricing for alcohol, Katikireddi et al found that public health advocates worked hard to redefine 
63 the policy issue by deliberately presenting a consistent alternative framing of alcohol policy as a 
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364 broad, multi-sectoral, public health issue necessitating a whole-population approach(33). The authors 
65 considered that reframing as vital in enabling policymakers to seriously consider the policy(33). The 
66 effectiveness with which stakeholders in a policy debate communicate their arguments is crucial in 
67 gaining support for their preferred policy option.
68 Walton suggests that arguments presented in the media are often used as rhetorically effective 
69 techniques to persuade a mass audience(34). The news media is thus a potentially important channel 
70 for stakeholders on both sides of any policy debate to promulgate their message. The way that health 
71 problems are defined in the news media (ie: the nature of the problem, its drivers, causal agendas, 
72 effects, and potential solutions), known as framing, thus plays a potentially very important role in 
73 influencing public and decision-makers’ interpretations of health issues(35; 36; 37). Public acceptance 
74 of a specific policy solution is often a prerequisite for decision-makers to implement an evidence-
75 based health policy(38; 39) and media framing of problems and solutions can therefore play a key role 
76 in determining that acceptability (40; 41; 42), as well as shaping social norms (43; 44; 45). 
77 Systematic reviews of the tactics employed by the alcohol and tobacco industries in attempting 
78 to influence marketing regulation have identified a common typology of frames used to argue against 
79 such regulation. Namely ‘increased regulation: (1) is unnecessary, (2) is not backed up by sufficient 
80 evidence, (3) will lead to unintended negative consequences, and (4) faces legal barriers to 
81 implementation; all underpinned by the message that (5) the industry consists of socially responsible 
82 companies working toward reducing harmful consumption’(27; 28; 29). While there are subtle 
83 differences in different industries’ argumentation, possibly due to their relative positions in the 
84 regulatory hierarchy(29), the literature broadly supports the idea that UCIs use a cross-industry 
85 ‘playbook’ to undermine effective public health policies(31).
86  The aim of this study was therefore to: (i) identify stakeholder arguments used on each side 
87 of the SDIL debate in UK newspaper coverage of SSB taxation and compare them with the frames 
88 used to resist increased regulation by the alcohol and tobacco industries(29); and (ii) generate insights 
89 into how anti-SDIL arguments may be countered, to inform future public health advocacy on this 
90 and other fiscal policies - both in the UK and world-wide, where there is still considerable resistance 
91 to such measures, for example in the USA(46; 47) and Australia(48). 
92
93 Methods
94 We used quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods. Firstly, we identified citations 
95 of relevant stakeholders in newspapers, their overall presented position as proponents or opponents 
96 in the SDIL debate, and the specific arguments in support of or opposing SSB tax attributed to them. 
97 Secondly, we conducted inductive thematic analysis of cited arguments to identify key themes that 
98 emerged from the data, and compared these with the established typology of industry frames(29). 
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499
100 Newspaper search and article selection
101 We employed newsprint content analysis based on methods developed by Hilton and 
102 colleagues at the University of Glasgow’s Social and Public Health Sciences Unit(49; 50; 51; 52). Eleven 
103 UK national newspapers with high circulation figures(53) were selected, along with their Sunday 
104 counterparts, to represent three genres: ‘broadsheet’, ‘middle-market’ and ‘tabloid’. This typology 
105 represents a range of readership profiles diverse in terms of age, social class and political 
106 alignment(53; 54). The time period of 1 April 2015 to 30 November 2016 was chosen to include 
107 coverage triggered by: the publication of reports from the World Health Organisation (WHO)(2), 
108 Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN)(16) and Public Health England (PHE)(10); the 
109 announcement of the UK SDIL (March 2016) and the UK Government’s consultation on the 
110 proposed SDIL(55; 56). 
111 The Nexis database(57) was searched for all articles published within the selected publications 
112 during the relevant date range that discussed the issue of SSB consumption and taxation. To identify 
113 relevant articles, a search string was developed for ‘sugar*’ and one or more of the following terms: 
114 ‘beverage*’, ‘soft drink*’, ‘fizz*’, ‘soda’, ‘tax*’ and ‘levy’ occurring anywhere in the text three or 
115 more times. The search returned 3,127 articles. While the specific policy debate of interest was the 
116 SDIL, many stakeholders used the more generic term of SSB tax or sugar tax when discussing fiscal 
117 measures aimed at reducing excess sugar consumption, therefore articles in which stakeholders used 
118 any of these terms were included. Hereafter we use the term SSB tax unless stakeholders specifically 
119 refer to the SDIL.
120 Articles were excluded if they: 1) did not directly cite stakeholders’ arguments for or against 
121 SSB tax or the SDIL; 2) were short lead-ins to a main story elsewhere in the same edition; 3) 
122 appeared exclusively in an Eire edition; 4) appeared in non-news sections of newspapers, including 
123 letters, advice, TV guide, sport, weather, obituaries or review sections. Letters are routinely excluded 
124 from media analysis as they represent the views of individual members of the public rather than 
125 stakeholders in the debate. Where a stakeholder provided an opinion piece for a newspaper, this was 
126 included in the analysis as a direct citation. After applying the exclusion criteria 2,636 articles were 
127 removed, leaving 491 for in-depth analysis. 
128
129 Article coding and stakeholder position analysis 
130 All articles were read in detail by one researcher (R1) to identify and capture the text of direct 
131 citations of stakeholder individuals and organisations. Each piece of text was coded for newspaper 
132 title, date, individual and/or organisation cited, and whether the argument was in support of, or 
133 opposition to, SSB taxation. Where stakeholders used evidence to back up their argument, the type 
Page 6 of 32
5134 of evidence used was coded. The quantitative coding frame is provided in supplementary 
135 information (File S1). A random subsample of 25% of the articles were double-coded by R2 to 
136 ensure coding consistency. Data were imported into IBM SPSS version 24 to calculate inter-rater 
137 agreement using Cohen’s kappa coefficient(58). 65% of codes returned a kappa score >0.4, which is 
138 typically interpreted as moderate agreement or better(59). Where less than substantial agreement was 
139 identified (kappa <0.61), code definitions were discussed within the research team and the coding 
140 frame and descriptor document were revised as required. 
141 An overview of the slant of opinion by stakeholder was calculated based on an index 
142 developed by Patterson et al(52). The index expresses the proportion of all supportive and 
143 oppositional statements associated with a stakeholder as a value on a scale from +100% (all 
144 supportive) to -100% (all opposed). Cited stakeholders were grouped into six categories according 
145 to their organisational affiliations: politicians and political organisations; public health organisations 
146 and professional bodies; industry representatives, manufacturers and retailers; non-governmental 
147 organisations (NGOs), health charities and campaigners; academics and evidence producers; and 
148 think-tanks and other analysts. These categories were constructed based on the need to structure the 
149 analysis by grouping stakeholders with likely shared values, and were chosen in line with the 
150 research team’s prior experience of researching public health policy debates. Individuals and 
151 organisations allocated to each group are listed in the supplementary information (File S2). For each 
152 stakeholder, the degree of support was then plotted against the total number of times that stakeholder 
153 was cited to provide a graphical representation of the most vocal supportive and oppositional groups.
154
155 Analysis of arguments in support of and in opposition to SSB tax/SDIL
156 Direct citations were imported into NVivo 11 for inductive thematic analysis. Each piece of 
157 text was coded to two separate nodes; stakeholder and theme raised. Individual stakeholder nodes 
158 were nested under stakeholder categories, as described above, and thematic nodes were nested under 
159 supportive and oppositional categories of argument.
160 The themes identified were compared with the established typology of industry arguments 
161 identified through systematic reviews of research on the alcohol and tobacco industries (27; 28; 29). In 
162 order to compare arguments used by both sides of the SSB tax debate with arguments relating to the 
163 regulation of other UCIs we developed a policy-neutral form of this typology (neither opposition 
164 nor support for SSB tax) i.e.: relevance of proposed regulation; evidence; unintended consequences 
165 and other benefits; legal and corporate social responsibility.
166
167 Results
168 Overview
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6169 Between 1st April 2015 and 30th November 2016, 491 newspaper articles were identified in 
170 which stakeholders were cited as presenting arguments and evidence in the SSB tax debate (Table 
171 1). Most articles were published in UK-wide newspapers (89%) and 74% appeared in ‘broadsheet’ 
172 newspapers.
173 A wide range of stakeholders (n=287: 34% organisations / 66% individuals), were cited in 
174 newspaper articles presenting views on SSB tax (n=1,761). A full list of all stakeholder organisations 
175 and named individuals is supplied in the supplementary information (File S2). 65% of arguments 
176 were in support of some form of SSB tax and 35% in opposition. Stakeholders infrequently cited 
177 evidence in support of their arguments (12% of the time) and the type of evidence used fell into 5 
178 categories: academic (citation of a specific academic study), lay opinion, expert opinion, anecdotal 
179 and financial (Table 2). The most frequently used type of evidence was anecdotal (44%) which was 
180 employed by both supporters and opponents of SSB tax. Supporters were more likely to cite a 
181 specific academic study or an expert opinion than opponents.
182
183 Overall stance on SSB taxation
184 Plotting the aggregate stance of each stakeholder group against frequency of citations revealed 
185 that public health organisations and professional medical associations (the most frequently cited 
186 stakeholder group with 25% of arguments) were most often cited as proponents of SSB tax, as were 
187 NGOs, charities, campaigners and academics (Fig1). Groups more frequently cited as opposing the 
188 measure included industry representatives and manufacturers (18% of arguments), think-tanks and 
189 economic research organisations. Most stakeholders were cited with consistent arguments, but a 
190 minority were cited as making both supportive and oppositional arguments, leaving their degree of 
191 support for SSB tax ambiguous and open to interpretation (File S2). Inconsistencies arose from: 
192 changes in ideological position (politicians and government representatives); insufficient clarity on 
193 the nature of the problem to be solved, excess sugar consumption vs obesity, and policy priorities 
194 (public health agencies); and consistency with academic rigour (academics). The group comprising 
195 politicians and political organisations were most diverse in their opinions, in line with the ideological 
196 positions held by its constituent stakeholders, with 68% of arguments in support of taxation and 32% 
197 opposing (Fig 1). Key individuals in this group (David Cameron, then Prime Minister, and Jeremy 
198 Hunt, then Health Secretary) were associated with initial oppositional positions and subsequent 
199 supporting positions as the debate developed. 
200
201 Thematic analysis and comparison with alcohol and tobacco frames
202 The themes that arose from the qualitative analysis of stakeholder arguments could be readily 
203 classified into the frame/sub-frame structure developed by researchers studying the alcohol and 
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7204 tobacco industries (Table 3). Table 3 presents summaries of typical arguments attributed to 
205 stakeholders within articles, organised by stance and frame/sub-frame. Most arguments fell into the 
206 evidence (40%) and regulation frames (31%), followed by the unintended consequences and other 
207 benefits frame (24%), the corporate social responsibility frame (4%) and the legal frame (1%).
208
209 Appropriateness of regulation: 
210 The arguments falling into the regulation frame focused on whether or not taxation was an 
211 appropriate solution to the problem of obesity. Opponents from the food and drink industry argued 
212 that the government should not intervene in the market, and that taxation would not prompt 
213 behaviour change. For example, the Food and Drink Federation was quoted as stating that: 
214 ‘Demonising one nutrient is not a healthy way to proceed. Consumer choice is the best way to go 
215 because government intervention simply doesn't work.’ (Independent, 28 August 2015). Some public 
216 health agencies opposed the measure because they felt other regulatory mechanisms were of greater 
217 priority such as: enforced reformulation and product labelling; control of marketing and promotions; 
218 and positive price instruments on healthy products. For example, the President of the Academy of 
219 Medical Royal Colleges was quoted as stating that: ‘a sugar tax is probably not top of the list of 
220 steps that need to be taken… Higher up would be reformulation of food, and we should curtail 
221 marketing of overly sweetened drinks and food like breakfast cereals to children.’ (Guardian, 25 
222 October 2015). 
223 Supporters of SSB taxation emphasised the scale of the problem and the urgent need for 
224 government action as part of a package of measures, with an emphasis on protecting young people. 
225 For example, the National Obesity Forum and Faculty of Public Health made mutually supportive 
226 statements: ‘Sugar is indeed the new tobacco. We know it is very harmful to health and we know we 
227 can use the same effective strategies that we used in tobacco control.’ And ‘A little gentle pressure 
228 from sugar taxes and other Government policies will help bring home the message’ (Daily Mirror, 
229 2 November 2016). 
230 Very few supporters highlighted the argument that the SDIL could be seen as a win-win 
231 solution. This position contends that the measure will either reduce sugar consumption (by 
232 discouraging consumer purchasing and/or encouraging manufacturer reformulation) and raise public 
233 revenue that can be reinvested in public health initiatives. The win-win concept was alluded to in 
234 the 2016 Chancellor’s budget statement: ‘he wanted to save the nation from an obesity crisis with a 
235 tax on fizzy drinks. He said he was convinced that his levy of up to 24p on a litre of fizzy pop would 
236 reduce consumption and reap a tax dividend for the exchequer’ (The Observer, 19 March 2016). 
237 Supportive stakeholders’ limited invocation of the win-win concept was potentially a missed 
238 opportunity to counter opponents’ arguments that sought to position reformulation as a failure of the 
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8239 policy. For example, Investec were associated with that argument: ‘Analysts at Investec said soft 
240 drinks makers would reformulate their products to avoid the tax, thereby reducing revenue for the 
241 chancellor.’ (Sunday Times, 20 March 2016).
242
243 Evidence of effectiveness (or lack thereof…):
244 The debate over the evidence bases for supporting or opposing SSB tax centred on the 
245 definition of the policy target; that is reducing sugar consumption vs tackling obesity. Opposing 
246 arguments hinged on the likely ineffectiveness of SSB tax in solving the long-term ‘obesity 
247 epidemic’, positioning the problem as too complex to solved by a fiscal measure. The Food and 
248 Drink Federation were cited as arguing that: ‘Additional burdensome taxes on foods or drinks are 
249 rejected by the public. This complex challenge needs a complex solution, one which involves and 
250 empowers people, not taxes them.’ (Guardian, 4 September 2015). Other opposing arguments 
251 included observing that SSB consumption was already in decline, but obesity continues to rise, and 
252 arguing that SSBs are a sufficiently small source of dietary calories that, even if consumption was 
253 reduced, it would have little or no impact on obesity and related NCDs. For example, the Institute 
254 of Economic Affairs was cited as saying: ‘Since soft drink taxes have only a modest effect on the 
255 consumption of this relatively minor source of calories, it should not be surprising that there is 
256 virtually no evidence sugary drink taxes have reduced obesity or improved health anywhere in the 
257 world.’ (Times, 13 January 2016). 
258 Conversely, supporting arguments focused on the importance of reducing SSB purchases and 
259 thus sugar consumption in the short term, emphasising the impact on specific health concerns such 
260 as type-2 diabetes and dental decay in children. Supporters made extensive use of modelling studies 
261 and evidence emerging from Mexico to back up their claims. For example, Public Health England 
262 was quoted as stating that: ‘The review highlights evidence from Mexico, where a soft drinks tax has 
263 led to a six per cent reduction in purchases. The point of the tax is to nudge people away from 
264 purchasing these things towards purchasing things that are more consistent with a healthy balanced 
265 diet.’ (Independent, 20 October 2015)
266 Three key pieces of evidence were used by stakeholders to support both supportive and 
267 oppositional arguments: The McKinsey report entitled Overcoming obesity: An initial economic 
268 analysis(9), the PHE report Sugar Reduction: The Evidence for Action(10) and a study published in 
269 the BMJ evaluating of the impact of the SSB tax in Mexico(5) (Table 4).
270
271 Unintended consequences and other benefits – both economic and public health:
272 Arguments highlighting unintended consequences and other benefits tended to focus 
273 specifically on the SDIL rather than SSB taxation more generally. Opponents argued that the SDIL 
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9274 would create negative economic impacts for soft drinks manufacturers, associated industries, the 
275 wider economy and consumers, particularly those in lower income groups. Opposing arguments 
276 characterised the measure as: regressive; costly to implement; inflationary and likely to cause job 
277 losses. For example, the British Soft Drinks Association was quoted as explaining that: ‘Given the 
278 economic uncertainty our country now faces, we're disappointed the Government wishes to proceed 
279 with a measure that analysis suggests will cause thousands of job losses.’ (Independent, 18 August 
280 2016). Opponents also asserted that the levy would fail to raise the anticipated public revenue as 
281 manufacturers would reformulate their products to avoid paying it, positioning this as a negative 
282 outcome rather than the positive one suggested in the ‘‘win-win’’ solution. 
283 Opposing arguments also emphasised the potential negative health consequences of 
284 consumers replacing SSBs with other sources of sugar or artificially-sweetened beverages (ASBs), 
285 suggesting that sugar is addictive and ASBs are no better for health than SSBs. The Institute for 
286 Fiscal Studies was quoted as reasoning that: ‘If people have a strong taste for sugar, although they 
287 may respond to the increase in prices by switching away from sugary soft drinks, it's entirely possible 
288 and quite likely they might switch towards other high sugar products.’ (Daily Mail, 18 March 2016). 
289 In contrast, supporters of the tax argued that there would be no adverse economic impact for 
290 industry or consumers, as the design of the SDIL allowed industry two years to reformulate their 
291 products with less sugar and that consumers could choose from many alternatives to SSBs and thus 
292 avoid the levy entirely. Additional benefits of the SDIL were highlighted in terms of: the potential 
293 for reinvestment of revenue raised into health improvement programmes and subsidies for 
294 ‘‘healthy’’ foods; the positive long-term impact of reduced NCDs on increased productivity and a 
295 reduced burden on the NHS; and sending a strong message to industry and consumers about the 
296 health impacts of excess sugar consumption. For example, the WHO was quoted as suggesting that: 
297 ‘Fiscal policies may encourage this group of consumers to make healthier choices (provided 
298 healthier alternatives are made available) as well as providing an indirect educational and public 
299 health signal to the whole population.’ (The Herald, 26 January 2016). 
300
301 Legality issues:
302 Unsurprisingly, only opponents of SSB tax were cited as making arguments highlighting the 
303 legality and potentially anti-competitive nature of the measure. For example, the British Soft Drinks 
304 Association stated: ‘It's fair to say we are more than just considering legal action. This has been 
305 rushed through without warning’ (Sunday Times, 20 Mar 2016). However, this line of argument 
306 was transient, surfacing only briefly at the time of the SDIL announcement in early March 2016, 
307 and disappearing by the end of that month. The Telegraph (30 March 2016) quoted AG Barr as 
308 saying: ‘‘[we are] fully committed to working with the Treasury on a full consultation that will have 
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309 an outcome that benefits consumers, shareholders and other stakeholders.’’, and added that ‘‘Mr 
310 White said that a legal challenge to the sugar tax was not being considered.’’. This was in contrast 
311 to the response of the alcohol industry to the announcement of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in 
312 Scotland, where a legal challenge significantly delayed implementation. 
313
314 The role of corporate social responsibility: 
315 The final frame represents a line of argument again primarily espoused by opponents of SSB 
316 tax: that the soft drinks industry has a positive role to play in promoting public health and that they 
317 are voluntarily reformulating their products to be healthier in response to consumer demand, without 
318 the need for taxation or other regulation. For example, one soft drinks manufacturer was quoted as 
319 stating that: ‘Our job is to understand and have relationships with our customers, which we have 
320 had for over 100 years, making sure we offer them choices. In stark contrast to other food and drink 
321 categories, we have been reducing sugar content and have a strong [commitment] to do so.’ 
322 (Guardian, 29 March 2016). Conversely, supporters of the measure questioned whether or not 
323 working in partnership with industry and relying on voluntary action had worked, pointing out the 
324 failure of the Public Health Responsibility Deal(60). For example, a Liberal Democrat MP was quoted 
325 as stating that: ‘The whole approach has been based on voluntary action. The question is whether 
326 that has succeeded. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed. We need to rethink our 
327 approach and ask if it has led to too cosy a relationship with the food industry.' (Daily Mail, 24 
328 October 2015).
329
330  Discussion
331 Our media content analysis revealed 1,761 arguments made by 287 stakeholders in the debate 
332 about SSB tax across 491 UK national newspaper articles, which is comparable with similar public 
333 debates on other policy measures such as e-cigarette regulation(52) and minimum unit pricing for 
334 alcohol(61; 62). Supportive statements outnumbered opposing ones by almost 2:1. The most frequently 
335 cited supporters of SSB tax were public health organisations and professional medical associations, 
336 while the most frequently cited opponents were soft drinks industry representatives. Both supportive 
337 and opposing arguments aligned with a typology framework developed for studying the alcohol and 
338 tobacco industries(27; 28; 29). 
339 Stakeholders on each side of the debate sought to use evidence to support their arguments; 
340 however, opponents were less likely to refer to specific academic studies and more likely to use 
341 anecdotal evidence. Interestingly, the same reports were sometimes invoked by both proponents and 
342 opponents to support their differing arguments, but using subtly different framings. The effective 
343 use of evidence is a potentially important factor in influencing public support for proposed policy 
Page 12 of 32
11
344 interventions(38; 63). However, a systematic review by Orton and colleagues found that, policy 
345 makers’ sceptical view of research evidence can create a key barrier to its use(64). Our findings on 
346 how evidence was used by stakeholders in the SDIL debate reinforce the importance of 
347 trustworthiness and reliability in the way research is represented, and then used or dismissed.
348 The use of taxation as an intervention to influence consumer behaviour and reduce 
349 consumption of unhealthy commodities is a well-established public health policy that has been used 
350 effectively in relation to both tobacco and alcohol(65; 66). However, a recent systematic review by 
351 Wright and colleagues highlighted the importance for policy actors to be clear about the primary 
352 objective of any health tax, be it for fiscal or health purposes, and to frame the tax accordingly(67) . 
353 Failure to do so leaves a proposed tax vulnerable to hostile lobbying(67). Our study identified 
354 inconsistencies in argumentation from three possible sources: changes in ideological position 
355 (politicians and government representatives); insufficient clarity on the nature of the problem to be 
356 solved and policy priorities (public health agencies); and consistency with academic rigour 
357 (academics). Whether a policy is anticipated to produce single or multiple outcomes, proponents 
358 need to identify the outcome or outcomes clearly and consistently. More clearly positioning the 
359 SDIL as a ‘win-win solution’, both lowering sugar consumption and raising revenues that can be 
360 reinvested in health service funding, could have been a useful, pragmatic approach to pre-empt 
361 opposing arguments. The limited invocation of that perspective may perhaps represent a missed 
362 opportunity for proponents of the policy.
363 A key strategy employed by other UCIs to oppose upstream regulation is the complexity 
364 argument, which Petticrew et al characterise as ‘Nothing can be done until everything is done’(31). 
365 Opponents of SSB tax employed this tactic by emphasising the complexity of the obesity problem, 
366 and therefore the inappropriateness of discrete legislative measures. Proponents apparently 
367 countered this by strategic simplification; that is by focusing on the specific health harming effects 
368 of excess sugar consumption, particularly from SSBs for young people. They further emphasised 
369 that the SDIL was not intended to be a ‘silver bullet’ to tackle obesity, but a small and important 
370 first step focussing on a commodity with negligible nutritional value. Similar, apparently deliberate, 
371 attempts to reframe policy debates were previously used by public health advocates in the case of 
372 minimum unit pricing for alcohol(33), and by supporters of legislation to prohibit smoking in private 
373 vehicles carrying children(68).
374 Advocates clearly need to continue to use effective arguments and embrace the persuasive 
375 power of framing. However, public health advocates and academics should also be aware of the 
376 potential for their over-critical analyses of nuanced aspects of policy measures to result in ‘mixed 
377 messages’ when filtered through media gatekeepers. Nuance is a strength of academia, and many 
378 academics are understandably wary of media commentators championing public health policies. 
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379 However, complex messages have the potential to create public confusion and actually undermine 
380 the intended public health objectives. Academics readily acknowledge uncertainty, but uncertainty 
381 rarely has a place in clear public communication(69). Researchers lacking media skills can thus find 
382 themselves uncomfortably positioned in complicated moral and affective landscapes, toiling to 
383 represent the nuance of their research(70). The challenge is to communicate the core truth simply, but 
384 without dumbing down the message into simplistic dichotomy. The mass media lens may depict 
385 rigorous academic circumspection as fragility of position, while industry representatives opposing 
386 regulation are unlikely to concede any uncertainty(69). 
387 We suggest that, in a bid to downplay the contribution of SSBs to NCDs, the soft drinks 
388 industry employed tactics previously used by other UCIs by ‘directly lobbying’ the public and 
389 policy-makers, shifting blame for obesity to complexity and optimistically trying to characterise the 
390 soft drinks industry as promoting healthy lifestyles(71). Our study also supports the findings of the 
391 systematic review by Mialon et al; that information and messaging is one of the most prominent 
392 corporate political activities employed by food industry actors(26).
393 Our study has relevance beyond debates about SSB tax. These data add to a growing body of 
394 research demonstrating the similarities in frames promoted by different harmful commodity 
395 industries across public health policy debates(27; 28; 30; 31). Our research may therefore help to inform 
396 future media strategies by advocates of upstream legislative public health measures targeting a range 
397 of harmful products, including sugar, tobacco(72) and alcohol(73). In particular, it may be helpful for 
398 public health proponents to support arguments with high-quality evidence, to communicate the 
399 subtleties of health policy development without undermining key objectives, and to be aware of the 
400 apparent shared UCI ‘playbook’(31).
401 Our research strengths include a rigorous approach which offers a robust examination of the 
402 newspaper debate around SSB tax. By coding and analysing direct quotations of stakeholders, we 
403 sought to minimise the impact of editorial gatekeepers and achieve greater fidelity than the more 
404 commonplace approach of analysing entire news articles. Our study is subject to the limitations 
405 which are intrinsic to media content analysis. Firstly, these data do not necessarily represent 
406 stakeholders’ intended positions, rather a collaboration between stakeholders and media 
407 gatekeepers, whereby those positions have been mediated, interpreted, filtered and contextualised 
408 by journalists and editors. However our exclusive use of quotes from individuals and directly 
409 attributable citations partly mitigates against this. Secondly, newspapers represent only one forum 
410 in which policy debates play out. Our analysis therefore omits the parliamentary arena, the judicial 
411 arena, social media and any non-public discussions that take place ‘behind closed doors’. However, 
412 understanding public debate in the media arena still offers a useful ‘door opener to the backstage of 
413 politics’, as Wodak and Meyer argue(74). A more comprehensive understanding of stakeholders’ 
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414 strategies might be triangulated from studying other forms of media, policy documents, or 
415 consultation responses, and conducting interviews with stakeholders. Thirdly, this form of 
416 representational content analysis cannot (and does not seek to) assess the effectiveness of 
417 stakeholder media communication strategies, only their implied intention. Further research on public 
418 perceptions of media messaging and stakeholder intention might usefully help to complete the 
419 picture. 
420
421 Conclusion
422 Public health advocates were particularly prominent in the debate surrounding the SDIL in 
423 UK newspapers. Mass media engagement can be used to influence how the public and policymakers 
424 understand health problems and their solutions and thus the acceptability of specific policies(35; 75). 
425 Research into how public health policy debates unfold in the media may help to inform improved 
426 media advocacy strategies(76). Opponents’ arguments resembled those used by the alcohol and 
427 tobacco industries in prior policy debates. Advocates in future policy debates could benefit from 
428 seeking a similar level of prominence and avoid inconsistencies by being clearer about the policy 
429 objective and mechanisms.
430
431
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628 Tables
629
630 Table 1 Number of newspaper articles included in the final sample by region, 
631 genre and newspaper title
Total articles
Region, genre and title
n %
United Kingdom
‘Broadsheet’
Guardian / Observer 88 18
Independent /i-Independent 84 17
Times / Sunday Times 90 18
Daily Telegraph / Sunday Telegraph 58 12
Middle Market
Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday 33 7
Express / Sunday Express 19 4
Tabloid
The Sun / Sunday Sun 50 10
Mirror / Sunday Mirror 13 3
Scotland
‘Broadsheet’
Scotsman / Scotland on Sunday 18 4
The Herald / Sunday Herald 27 5
Tabloid
Daily Record / Sunday Mail 11 2
Total 491 100
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
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640 Table 2 Frequency of use of evidence cited in support of and opposition to SSB tax
641
  
Citations in     
support of SSB tax
(n=155)
Citations in 
opposition to SSB 
tax
(n=66)
n 58 40Anecdotal
(n=98) % 37 61
n 36 7Academic
(n=43) % 23 11
n 31 8Financial 
(n=39) % 20 12
n 23 7Expert
(n=30) % 15 11
n 7 4Opinion
(n=11) % 5 6
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643 Table 3. Summary of frames, sub-frames and key arguments made by opponents and proponents of SDIL. (Frame adapted from Savell et 
644 al.(27; 28) and Martino et al.(29)
Frame Sub frame(s) Arguments opposing SSB tax Arguments in support of SSB tax
Regulation 
Opp 35% / Prop 65%
 Other regulation would to be more effective in tackling obesity
 Positive price instruments are needed
 Taxation is an inappropriate mechanism for behaviour change
 Sugar cannot be regulated like alcohol and tobacco 
 Obesity too complex a problem to solve with fiscal measures
 Additional taxation is un-conservative and unpopular – nanny statist
 Focus should be on solving inequalities
 No silver bullet / a useful start as part of a package of measures
 Will prompt reformulation to avoid the levy / health by stealth
 Reluctant to impose new taxes but have to start dealing with obesity 
somewhere / nothing else is working
 Sugar is the new tobacco and should be regulated as such
 Relatively quick and easy to implement – a quick win
 Public are in favour of decisive government action / even taxation
 SSB consumption is a particular issue for young people, therefore an 
appropriate target for Government intervention
35% 65%
Evidence
Opp 31% / Prop 69%
 No evidence of effectiveness anywhere in world
 Those who buy SSBs are not price sensitive
 Won’t reduce calorie intake therefore no effect on obesity
 SSB consumption is declining anyway – no effect on obesity
 Evidence shows that SSB tax reduces purchases
 Will reduce tooth decay, obesity and related NCDs
31% 69%
Manufacturers  Will lead to industry failure, job losses and reduced innovation
 The SDIL is complex, confusing and difficult/costly to implement 
 No adverse economic impact as industry has 2 years to reformulate
40% 60%
 The SDIL will cost jobs across the UK in associated industriesAssociated 
Industries 100% 0%
Public revenue  The levy will not raise the anticipated revenue
 Increased taxation will cause inflation / decline in output
 Revenue raised can be used to fund health improvement programmes 
and/or subsidise ‘healthy’ foods
 Reduced loss of productivity from NCDs will benefit economy
 Revenue for NHS to offset costs of obesity / reduced long-term costs
19% 81%
Consumers  Tax is regressive / will impact lower income groups disproportionately  There are many alternatives to SSBs / no-one needs to drink SSBs and pay 
the levy
Economic 
Opp 37% / Prop 63% 
85% 15%
 People will switch to other sugar sources / unhealthy drinks
 ASBs are no more healthy
 Sends a clear message that sugar is bad for health
 Will nudge people to choose low/no sugar options
 Low income groups will see the greatest health benefits
Unintended 
consequences/ 
other benefits
Opp 38% / Prop 62%
Public Health 
Opp 46% / Prop 54%
46% 54%
Legal  SDIL is illegal / anti-competitive
Opp 100% / Prop 0% 100% 0%
Corporate social 
responsibility
 Industry is reformulating anyway in response to consumer demand
 SDI plays an active role in promoting healthy lifestyles
 The Public Responsibility Deal has failed
Opp 66% / Prop 34% 66% 34%
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645 Table 4: Use of evidence to support stakeholder arguments
646
Report/Study Use in opposing arguments Use in supportive arguments
Overcoming obesity: An 
initial economic analysis 
(2014) Dobbs et al. (9) 
‘But we want to see action based on evidence of what 
works. Taxes did not make the top 10 most effective 
interventions to reduce obesity in the McKinsey Global 
Institute's obesity report.’ Soft drink manufacturer
(Telegraph 26 May 2016)
[Calling for SSB tax and citing the McKinsey report] ‘The 
total economic loss from obesity to the UK was calculated 
at £49bn in 2012.’ Cancer Research UK/UK Health Forum
(Guardian 19 February 2016)
Sugar reduction: The 
Evidence for Action (2015) 
Public Health England(10) 
‘It may also be possible, by negotiation, to improve the 
definition of 'high sugar foods' as the [PHE] report 
suggests. However, we do not agree that the international 
evidence supports the introduction of a sugar tax.’ 
Food & Drink Federation
(Guardian 29 October 2015)
‘We welcome this [PHE] report, and the contribution this 
will make to reduce obesity levels, particularly among 
children. Hard-hitting action is necessary on pricing, 
reformulation and promotion of high-sugar products.’
Professional Association
(Guardian 22 October 2015)
Beverage purchases from 
stores in Mexico under the 
excise tax on sugar sweetened 
beverages: observational 
study (2016) Colchero et al.(5)
‘The Mexican reductions were equivalent to one less sugar 
cube a day per person, which was a drop in the calorific 
ocean.’ Academic
(Guardian, 7 January 2016)
‘Unequivocal evidence from other countries [Mexico] has 
shown that a sugar tax duty on soft drinks will reduce sales 
of sugar-sweetened soft drinks, particularly among the 
more socially deprived.’ Health organisations statement 
(Guardian 24 June 2016)
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648 Figure legends
649 Fig 1. Frequency of citations by stakeholder group and their aggregate stance towards SSB 
650 tax/SDIL
651
652 Supplementary information
653 File S1. Quantitative coding frame
654 File S2. Full list of stakeholder organisations, named individuals, allocation to stakeholder groups.
655
Page 26 of 32
 Frequency of citations by stakeholder group and their aggregate stance towards SSB tax/SDIL 
186x115mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
Page 27 of 32
Coding frame used to analyse final sample of newspaper articles
coder initials ………………..
To be completed if the article specifically mentions SSB taxation/"sugar tax" or the Soft Drinks Industry Levy
1       Article ID 15      Description of taxation YES NO
15.1 ''Sugar tax' 1 2
#REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! 15.2 SSB taxation 1 2
15.3 Soft Drinks Industry Levy 1 2
16     Specifically in relation to SSB taxation/"sugar tax" or the Soft Drinks Industry Levy… YES NO
16.1 Arguments for taxation…
16.1.1 Positive impact on consumption / purchases 1 2
(ie: will help to change behaviour / reduce consumption of sugar/SSBs)
16.1.2 Positive health impact 1 2
(ie: will help to reduce obesity/diabetes/other NCDs/mortality)
16.1.3 Positive financial impact 1 2
(eg: funding for NHS/ schools/ physical education/ PH education / subsidies for F&V etc)
16.1.4 Sends clear message 1 2
(eg: to industry to change behaviour /reformulate and to parents to and children about 
importance of reducing consumption / to government to take action)
16.1.5 Proposed tax should be more extreme 1 2
(ie: needs to be tougher / extend to other sugar containing products / extend to 
other 'unhealthy' products eg: high fat / needs to happen sooner)
16.1.6 Proposed tax could be an important first step (can be done quickly and relatively easily) 1 2
(ie: needs to be one of a range of legislative measures / taxation not enough on its own)
16.2 Evidence for taxation…
16.2.1 Specific evidence provided - Source: ________________________________________ 1 2
(ie: specify what type & source - academic / opinion / expert / anecdotal / financial
16.2.2 Evidence of success 1 2
(eg: red. SSB/sugar consumption / purchases / health outcomes / inc. reformulation)
16.2.3 Evidence from other countries / contexts 1 2
(ie: effect in other countries that have introduced such a tax eg: Mexico)
16.3 Arguments against taxation…
16.3.1 Negative financial impact 1 2
(eg: company profits / job losses / consumer confidence / wider economy / inflation / shopping bills)
16.3.2 Impact on lower socio-economic groups 1 2
(ie: disproportionate impact)
16.3.3 Food & drinks taxes already exit 1 2
(eg: 20% VAT)
16.3.4 Taxation unfair on SSB industry - anticompetitive / discriminatory 1 2
(eg: SSB companies being made a scapegoat / punitive / disappointing / 
should also apply to other industries and/or sugar producers)
16.3.5 Unintended negative health consequences 1 2
(eg: substitution for other 'unhealthy' products / switch to other low cost options)
16.3.6 Demonisation of sugar 1 2
(ie: sugars can be enjoyed in moderation/ focusing on one nutrient won't solve obesity)
16.3.7 SSB taxation not the answer - consumption of sugar in SSBs is actually falling 1 2
(eg: not the most significant source of sugar / other nutrients more/equally damaging
eg: high fat / needs a comprehensive set of actions)
16.3.8 Taxation as a mechanism not the answer 1 2
(ie: not an effective way of changing behaviour / need positive price mechanisms)
16.3.9 Consumer / brand loyalty 1 2
(ie: consumers will continue to buy regardless  eg: Irn Bru at the heart of being Scottish 
/ price inelasticity of 'sin' products)
16.3.10 Other legislation might be better / is needed 1 2
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(eg: warning labels / legal max levels / bans on food & drinks / greater advertising controls)
16.3.11 Nanny state - autocratic / government intervention doesn't work 1 2
(ie: loss of freedom of choice for individual / won't be supported by public)
16.3.12 Existing voluntary action is enough / could be extended 1 2
(ie: SSB industry already doing / planning to do its bit eg: reformulation / advertising
 controls / portion sizes /calorie caps / banning products in supermarkets / better labelling)
16.3.13 Implementation issues (will take too long / distraction from Brexit) 1 2
(eg: unworkable / high cost of implementation / which SSBs included/excluded)
16.4 Evidence against taxation…
16.4.1 Specific evidence provided - Source: ________________________________________ 1 2
(ie: specify what type & source - academic / opinion / expert / anecdotal / financial
16.4.2 Evidence of failure 1 2
(eg: no change in SSB/sugar consumption / health outcomes / calorie intake)
16.4.3 Evidence from other countries / contexts 1 2
(ie: other countries that have introduced such a tax eg: Mexico)
16.4.4 Lack of evidence to support taxation 1 2
(ie: states that no evidence exists / doesn't believe the evidence)
16.5 Other points for debate
16.5.1 Headline position statement 1 2
(ie: makes a clear headline statement for or against SSB taxation)
16.5.2 Comparison with other legalisation 1 2
(eg: alcohol / tobacco / salt)
16.5.3 Clarifies what the tax is 1 2
(ie: is a levy on the SD industry - NOT a sugar tax / does not have to be passed on the consumer)
16.5.4 Legal challenge 1 2
(ie: suggests a legal challenge to the government)
16.5.5 Evaluation 1 2
(ie: need to be able to evaluate and withdraw if not working)
16.5.6 Government response 1 2
(ie: Government is unlikely to support a sugar tax / delaying tactics)
17     Who are the key actors in the  debate and what arguments to do they make?
         (name, organisation and position on the  problem, drivers and solutions)17.1 Stakeholders: Government represe tatives / organisation
17.2 Stakeholders: Public health organisation / advocates / professional body
17.3 Stakeholders: Industry representatives / producers / retailers
17.4 Stakeholders: NGO / Charity
17.5 Stakeholders: Academics / Evidence producers
17.6 Stakeholders: Others (eg: Individuals)
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S2 Supplementary information: Full list of stakeholder organisations, named individuals, allocation to stakeholder groups
Political representatives / organisations         Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
UK Government (CON)
George Freeman (PUSS for Life Sciences Minister), Dan Poulter 
(former Health Secretary), Nick Herbert (MP), Nicola Blackwood 
(Public Health Minister), Jane Ellison (ex-PH Minister), Flick 
Drummond (MP)
UK Government (CON)
Prime Minister’s spokesperson, Jacob Rees-Mogg (MP), Philip 
Davies (MP), Will Quince (MP)
UK Government (CON)
David Cameron (Prime Minister), Jeremy 
Hunt (Health Secretary), Boris Johnson 
(Mayor of London)
Department of Health
Sir Liam Donaldson (former CMO), Prof Susan Jebb, (Chair Food 
Responsibility Network)
Department of Health Department of Health 
Dame Sally Davies (Chief Medical Officer)
Treasury
Jane Ellison (Financial secretary to HMT)
Treasury Treasury
George Osborne (Chancellor)
Health Select Committee (Cross party)
Dr Sara Wollaston – Chair (CON), 
Health Select Committee (Cross party)
Andrea Jenkyns (CON), Andrew Percy (CON)
Other UK parties
Jeremy Corbyn (LAB), Helen Jones (LAB), Sadiq Khan (LAB – 
Mayoral candidate), Norman Lamb (LD), 
Scottish Politicians
Catherine Calderwood (CMO), John Swinney (Finance Minister 
SNP), Scottish Labour Party, Kezia Dugdale (SLAB Leader), Scottish 
Liberal Democrats, Alex Cole-Hamilton (SLD MSP), Jim Hulme 
(SLD MSP)
Scottish Politicians
Scottish Conservative Party, Aileen Campbell (Public Health Minister 
SNP), Maureen Watt (former Public Health Minister SNP), Patricia 
Gibson (SNP MSP)
Scottish Politicians
Scottish Government (SNP), Dr Steve 
Simpson (SLAB MSP) 
Welsh Politicians
Welsh Nationalist Party (WNP)
Welsh Politicians
Welsh Government (WLAB)
Mexican politicians Mexican politicians
PH orgs / experts / professional bodies     Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
Public Health agencies
Duncan Selbie (Chief Exec. PHE), Association of Directors of Public 
Health, Royal Society for Public Health: Dame Shirley Cramer (Chief 
Exec), UK Faculty of Public Health: Prof John Ashton (President); 
Prof Simon Capewell (VP for Policy), UK Health Forum: Jane 
Landon (Dep Chief Exec); Dr Laura Webber (Dir PH Modelling), 
Overseas Development Institute: Steve Wiggins, World Health 
Organisation: Margaret Chen (Head), Michael Bloomberg (Global 
Ambassador for NCDs), Dr Douglas Bettcher (Dir Dept for 
Prevention of NCDs), Dr Francesco Branca (Nutrition Director), Joao 
Breda (European PM for Nutrition), World Obesity Federation: Tim 
Lonstein (Head of Policy), Mexican National Institute of Public 
Health and PH advocates
Public Health agencies Public Health agencies
Public Health England, Dr Alison Tedstone 
(Chief Nutritionist, PHE)
Medical Associations & health experts
NHS England, Stephen Dorrell (Chair NHS Confederation of Health 
Service Managers), British Medical Association: Dr Richard Vautrey 
(Dep Chair BMA GPs Committee), Dr Sheila Hollins (Chair BMA 
Medical Associations & health experts
Catherine Collins (British Dental Health Foundation), Steve Lumb 
(GP)
Medical Associations & health experts
Simon Stevens (Chief Exec NHS England), 
Prof Dame Sue Bailey (President, Academy 
of Medical Royal Colleges), “health 
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Board of Science), Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, British 
Dental Association: Henrik Overgaard Neilson (Chair BDA General 
Dental Practice Committee), Prof Walmsley (Scientific Advisor), 
British Dental Health Foundation: Dr Nigel Carter (Chief Exec), 
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health: Prof Neena Modi 
(President), Royal College of Physicians: Prof John Wass (Academic 
Vice President), Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons Scotland: 
Prof Derek Bell (President), Royal College of Surgeons: Prof Hunt 
(Dean of Dental Surgery), Dr Alice Hodkinson (GP), Dr Hema Gore 
(GP), Dr A Malhotra (Consultant Cardiologist)
experts”
Food and nutrition experts
Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition: Prof Ian Macdonald 
(Chair Working Group on Carbohydrates and Health), Elspeth 
Macdonald (Dep Chief Exec FSS), London Food Board: Rosie 
Boycott (Chair)
Food and nutrition experts Food and nutrition experts
Food Standards Scotland
Industry reps / producers / retailers                Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
Industry associations & representatives
“The industry”, British Soft Drink Association (BSDA): Gavin 
Partington (Director General), Peter Harding (President), UK Food & 
Drink Federation( UKFDF): Ian Wright (Director General), Tim 
Rycroft (Dir of Corporate Affairs), UK Sugar Bureau, American 
Beverage Association, Scotland Food & Drink: James Withers (Chief 
Exec), Scottish Food & Drink Federation: David Thomson (Chief 
Executive Officer), Scottish Grocers Federation: Pete Cheema (Chief 
Executive Officer), Industry bodies and retailers in Mexico
Manufacturers & producers
AG Barr: Roger White (Chief Exec), Coca-Cola: Leendert Den 
Hollander (VP and GM at European Partners), Jon Woods (General 
Manager Great Britain), Britvic: Simon Litherland (Chief Executive), 
Paul Graham (Managing Director UK), Peter Harding (Chief 
Operating Officer, LRS), Marnie Millart (Chief Executive, Vimto), 
Mary Barnard (Head of UK Division, Cadbury), Pieraldo Oldano (UK 
Chief Exec, Ferrero Rocher), Unilever: Paul Polman (Chief Executive 
Officer), AB Sugar, Association British Foods: George Weston (Chief 
Exec), Paul Kenward (MD British Sugar)
Retailers & restauranteurs
John Vincent (Chief Executive Officer & Co-founder of Leon 
restaurants)
Retailers & restauranteurs
Wetherspoons: Tim Martin (Chairman), Starbucks: Sarah Bruce-
Goodwin (Vice President for R&D), Ramesh Pabari (sweet shop 
owner) Sainsburys: Mike Coupe (Chief Exec), Tescos, Waitrose, 
“supermarket boss”
NGOs / charities / campaigners                       Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
Charities and NGOs
Action on Sugar: Prof Graham MacGregor (Chairman), Katharine 
Jenner (Campaign Director), Jenny Rosborough (Nutritionist & 
Campaign Manager), Kawther Hashem (Nutritionist & Researcher), 
Cancer Research UK: Alison Cox (Dir of Cancer Prevention), Prof 
Charities and NGOs Charities and NGOs
Tam Fry (Head Spokesperson, National 
Obesity Forum)
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Linda Bauld (Cancer Prevention Champion), Gregor McNie (Public 
Affairs Manager, Scotland), Diabetes UK:  Chris Askew (Chief 
Exec), Louise Ansari (Dir of Prevention), Prof Alan Sinclair (Dir 
Diabetes Frail Project), National Obesity Forum: Prof David Haslam 
(Chair), National Obesity Forum, Obesity Action Scotland: Lorraine 
Tulloch (Programme Lead), Dr Emilia Crighton (member), Sustain: 
Kath Dalmeny (Chief Executive), Ben Reynolds (Deputy Chief 
Executive), Malcolm Clark (Co-ordinator Children’s Food Campaign 
& spokesperson), Obesity Health Alliance, Nutritional Health 
Alliance, Health Equalities Group: Rob Ireland (Chief Exec)
Campaigners
Jamie Oliver (chef), James Cracknell (athlete), Paul Hollywood (TV 
presenter),  David Gandy (model), Andrew Fairlie (chef), 
“campaigners”
Campaigners
Heston Blumenthal (chef)
Academics / evidence producers                    Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
UK Academics and academic institutions
British Medical Journal study, Prof Simon Capewell (University of 
Liverpool), Prof Graham MacGregor (Wolfson Institute of 
Preventative Medicine), Kawther Hashem (Queen Mary University 
London), Professor Mike Rayner (Nuffield Dept of Population 
Health), Prof Francesco Cappuccio (University of Warwick), Dr 
Richard Hoffman (University of Hertfordshire), Prof Leigh Sparks 
(Stirling University), Prof M Ezzati (Imperial College London), 
Brighton University, University of Oxford, 
Academics and academic institutions
Dr Boyka Bratanova (St Andrews University), Prof JT Winkler 
(London Metropolitan University), Tom Sanders (King's College 
London), University of Cambridge, Centre for Diet and Activity 
Research
Academics and academic institutions
Prof Naveed Sattar (University of 
Glasgow),  Prof Susan Jebb, University of 
Oxford, Prof Mike Lean (University of 
Glasgow) 
International academics and academic institutions
Prof Sirpa Sarlio Lahteenkorva (Finnish Expert), Mary Gorski 
(Harvard University), Christina Roberto (University of Pennsylvania), 
Prof Robert Lustig (University of California), University of North 
Carolina
Think tanks and other analysts                        Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
Think tanks
Policy Exchange, Ben Thomson (Chair Reform Scotland)
Think tanks
TaxPayer’s Alliance, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
Other analysts
Credit Suisse, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD): Franco Sassi (Head of Public Health)
Other analysts
McKinsey Global Institute, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), Oxford 
Economics, Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR), DWF, Ersnt & 
Young,  Investec, Numis, Shore Capital “Analysts”
Other                                                                   Proponents Opponents Mixed messages
Soil Association, other named individuals Brighton Students against Sugar Tax, “Right wing group”, YouGov 
Survey, other named individuals
ComRes survey
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